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1 Introduction
The political and humanitarian situation in Afghanistan continues to be of
serious concern to the international community. Whereas international media
coverage and debate indicates little change, this report establishes fundamental
developments in three areas: the humanitarian situation; the Taliban
administrative system, and the approach taken by international aid agencies,
the UN in particular.
This report is commissioned by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MFA), and builds on interviews, document reviews, and previous fieldwork.
Over a period of 10 days, we have conducted semistructured and focus group
interviews in Afghanistan (Kabul; Wardak, and Nangarhar provinces), and
Pakistan (Islamabad and Peshawar). The researchers have had access to a
number of reports and papers that have been prepared for the forthcoming
meeting of the Afghan Support Group (ASG) in Switzerland, as well as various
newsreports. The focus of the research has been on the influence of the
political and military situation upon the humanitarian conditions for
Afghanistan’s citizens, as well as upon the working conditions for agencies
providing humanitarian assistance. The reports takes as reference points a
short review of the history to the conflict, the specific ‘aid practice’ that has
developed for Afghanistan, as well as the present political and military
context, nationally and internationally, that assistance is provided in.
The CMI wishes to thank all those that on a short notice made themselves
available for interviews. We also would like to express our gratitude to those
who facilitated our visits, especially the Director and staff of Coordination of
Afghan Relief (CoAR) who organised our travel inside Afghanistan. The
researchers are solely responsible for the views expressed in the report, which
should not be seen as a representation of the policy of the Norwegian Ministry
of Foreign Affairs.
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2 Abstract
Twenty years of war and civil war in Afghanistan has increased the
vulnerability of the population, now faced with ongoing military
confrontation between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance, with a low
concern for people living in areas under their control, and a severe draught. A
continued need for emergency relief projects, increased rehabilitation efforts
and more development oriented programmes seems well documented.
The two parties to the conflict have showed unfortunate similarities in their
practise of relating to drug production and trafficking, violation of human
rights and support to international terrorism. Hence, a solution to the current
stalemate is not likely to be found in escalating support to or sanction of one
of the present parties. One could thus argue that continued dialogue between
the International community and the warring fractions and stronger emphasis
on a longer-term strategy of building civilian structures would be beneficial for
the humanitarian intervention in Afghanistan.
The Taliban have over the last years strengthened their administrative
structure and now demands to be recognised as an authority within
Afghanistan, although not recognised by the United Nations. The various
humanitarian actors, however, have found their own ways of engaging with
the Taliban, despite the introduction of a Strategic Framework and agreement
on Principled Common Programming. There is a difference in opinion
between the political and humanitarian wings of the United Nations on effects
and implications of the sanctions imposed on the Taliban, where humanitarian
actors now argue for increased contact with the Taliban administration and a
policy of “scaling-up” and “principled negotiations”.
This report provides a more in-depth review of the Taliban governance
structure and discusses the possibility of a decrease in drug production
following an edict issued by the Taliban leader. It looks into the possibility of
increased migration and long term decrease of agricultural production if the
draught is not properly mitigated. It furthermore notices that the effects of the
UN sanctions does not seem to have any significant impact on the Taliban but
that the common Afghan is increasingly blaming the international community
for their worsened living conditions.
Finally, a conclusion is drawn recommending the United Nations, donors and
humanitarian agencies to make a clear distinction between their humanitarian
and political efforts, and to ensure that the dual process of peace-negotiations
and peace-building is continued. It is argued that the prolonged conflict
requires a longer time horizon for the humanitarian intervention, with more
emphasis on “software” and strengthening of national capacities. This, again,
requires a better understanding of the current situation, a need to include
Afghans in study processes and ability to operationalise study findings.
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3 Background to the present humanitarian
disaster
Afghanistan is situated in Central Asia with Pakistan, Iran, China, Tadjikistan,
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan as its neighbours.  It is a mountainous country
divided by the Hindu Kush range and inhabited by several ethnic groups:
Pashtuns, which form the single largest group, but with large population of
Tajik, Hazara and Uzbek origin, in addition to a variety of other groups. The
main religion is Sunni Islam, but an estimated 15% of the population are
Shi`ia Muslims. Human settlements in Afghanistan are primarily rural.  More
than three-quarters of the pre-war population of 15 million lived in villages,
commonly sited on irrigated valley floors or near natural sources of water.
Even before the Soviet invasion in 1979 the country was among the least
developed in the world, with large social differences between the countryside
and the cities, notably the capital Kabul. The nepotism of the ruling royal
family and a small political elite led to growing resentment, particularly within
an emerging middle-class of educated people. The protest was channelled into
communist parties of both Maoist and Soviet orientation, as well as radical
Islamic groups linked to the Muslim Brotherhood. The latter took up arms in
the mid-1970s, receiving substantial military training and equipment from
Pakistan. Following the 1978 Afghan communist coup and the 1979 Soviet
invasion, Pakistan favoured these groups as the chief conduits for
international military and humanitarian assistance.
The war caused tremendous suffering and destruction. It has been estimated
that five million Afghans took refuge in Pakistan and Iran, more than one
million Afghans lost their lives, and 700,000 Afghans were left physically and
mentally disabled.1 Whereas it was the countryside that was hardest hit in the
period from 1979 to 1992, the city populations were the chief victims of the
infighting between various mujahedin groups from 1993 to 1996. Large parts
of Kabul were destroyed, an estimated 25,000 were killed, and at least half a
million were internally displaced.
The war made the population of Afghanistan increasingly dependent on
outside assistance, most of which has been implemented by international and
national NGOs. In the 1980s, the assistance was heavily politicised, with
support to the just cause of the mujahedin overshadowed any concerns with
issues such as drugs production, gender, or human rights. The particular “aid
practice” that took shape in this context was characterised by free handouts,
no monitoring, and full trust in the military commanders that were seen as the
people’s representatives. At the same time, aid agencies had considerable
freedom to manoeuvre, given that there was no functioning authority beyond
                                           
1 Sliwinsky, M. (1989), Afghanistan: The Decimation of a People, in Orbis: A Journal of
World Affairs, Winter 1989: 39-56.
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the local level. Aid organisations were built up in Peshawar. Most national
employees came from Kabul, were men of Pashtun ethnic origin, and had
strong relations to the radical Islamic parties. This has led to considerable
inertia in terms of adapting to the post 1992 situation, with a preference for
Peshawar-near projects, distance between agency staff and Afghanistan's rural
population, and poor relations as Taliban’s leadership replaced that of the
mujahedin. Many of the NGOs continued to advocate for their freedom to
work independently from any government structure.
The needs for continued humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan is not
disputed. However, it is a paradox that large parts of the country has been at
peace for up to ten years, yet much of the assistance is provided in the form of
short-term emergency relief or rebuilding projects. A further problem is that
many of the key providers of assistance, particularly international NGOs,
appears to possess limited capacity to analyse and adapt to fundamental
changes in the country, neither at the local nor at the central level.
C M I
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4 Present military and political situation
The current humanitarian situation can only be understood against the
background of the military conflict between the Taliban and the Northern
Alliance, and, furthermore, the political conflict between the Taliban and the
larger international community, represented by the United Nations.
The Taliban, under the leadership of (Emir) Mullah Mohammad Omar, have
established the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA), which they perceive as
the legitimate government of the country. Although the Taliban now control
about 90% of the territory including all major cities, it is only recognised by
three states.2 The Northern Alliance includes the majority of the political
parties and militia groups that fought each other for control of Kabul from
1993 to 1996. The alliance still controls Afghanistan’s chair at the UN. It is
somewhat confusingly referred to as both the government and the opposition.
The alliance is led by Burhanuddin Rabbani, whose presidential period has
since long expired, with commander Ahmad Shah Massoud being a key force.
Fraught with internal conflict, most of the leaders of the alliance now live in
exile.
Both sides receive military assistance from outside, the Taliban mainly from
Pakistan, the Northern Alliance from Iran, Russia and India. In Pakistan, a
variety of actors have direct relations to the Taliban, and the country has
proved unable to develop a consistent policy. Iran’s role is increasingly
ambiguous, as it continues to provide military support to the alliance, but has
opened up for extensive trade with the Taliban, and is gradually re-
establishing diplomatic ties. Russia argues that their support for the Northern
Alliance aims at stemming Islamic insurgence in Central Asia, but their tough
line now meets opposition. Amongst the Central Asian states, Turkmenistan
has had a formalised relationship with the Taliban for several years, and more
recently, both Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have taken up diplomatic contact.
The leading interpretation of this new development is that these states now see
a dialogue with the Taliban as more likely to produce positive results in terms
of stemming their own radical Islamists, but also that this signals increasing
opposition to Russia’s attempts at dominating foreign policy in the region.
The conflict between the Taliban and the international community originates
in a number of issues, with key issues being support to international terrorism
(particularly the Bin Laden issue); human rights (particularly the rights of
women); drug production and export, as well as restrictions placed on
humanitarian agencies.3 Many observers see the 1998 US missile attack on
alleged terrorist training camps as a fatal blow to a dialogue process that was
                                           
2 For more on the emergence of the Taliban, see Arne Strand and Kristian Berg Harpviken,
Afghanistan: Humanitære utfordringar og mogelegheiter, Memo presented for the Norwegian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 15. juli, 2000.
3 Other issues include the the unresolved murder of several UN staff members in Afghanistan
and the continuation of war against the Northern Alliance government.
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slowly taking form at the time. The conflict potential is large, and both sides
tend to be represented with their respective “hardliners”. A key issue is the
sanctions imposed on the Taliban regime due to their rejection of UN Security
Council resolution demanding extradition of Osama bin Laden. It is
interesting to note that UN agencies are increasingly pointing out that their
role is an explicitly humanitarian one, criticising the UN sanctions for their
humanitarian impact. Whereas this has been noticed by the Taliban as a
significant gesture, it is being strongly opposed by the Northern alliance, and
also by a number of countries who see no alternative to sanctions.
In terms of international diplomacy and media relations, the groups that
constitute the Northern Alliance have been able to draw on an apparatus
developed in the 1980s. The Taliban has proven less capable in this regard,
but interestingly, it seems now to be much more consistent in how it presents
its policy, as recently demonstrated in statements on Osama bin Laden, on
drugs, and on UN recognition. A more proactive role can be expected.
However, as we have argued before, the principal differences between the
Taliban and the Northern alliance when it comes to key issues of dispute with
the international community, such as drugs, gender, or support to
international terrorism, are largely negligible.4
Drugs: Afghanistan has a long history of production of various forms of
narcotic substance, but production has exploded since the early 1980s. During
the mujahideen period central commanders were involved in opium cultivation
and heroin processing, but only token efforts were made to curb the
production. Presently, the bulk of the production is in Taliban-controlled
areas, but there is also significant production in areas controlled by the
Northern Alliance. In early August, Mullah Omar issued an edict banning
poppy cultivation, and current indications are that the edict is being
implemented in key poppy-producing areas, including Nangarhar and
Kandahar.
Human rights: The Taliban has been the subject of massive international
criticism for its human rights violations, in terms of discrimination of women
and targeting of non-Pashtuns, including forced expulsion and outright
massacres. Ethnically motivated killings also took place during the Rabbani-
government, with the large-scale killings of Hazara in Kabul in 1994 being the
best documented, still referred to as the “Afshahr massacre”. Turning to the
gender dimension, Heike Bill, at a recent conference in Germany, pointed out
that “restrictions imposed on women do not reflect a specific Taliban ideology
but have rather had the effect of institutionalizing and legitimizing patterns of
oppression already prevailing in Afghanistan before its assumption of
power.”5 Another issue is the use of Sharia punishments for crime, a practice
                                           
4 Strand & Harpviken, 2000
5 Afghanistan- Country Without State?, Munich 15-18 June 2000, conference report by C.
Schetter & C. Noelle-Karimi in ISIM Newsletter 6/00. A similar point is made by Cammack:
”the Taliban’s social and gender policies are not that much different from those established by
other muhjahedeen parties at home an in exile during the last fifteen years. Indeed, in many
respects the changes in policy evident in 1995 to 1996 were not so much a matter of substance
than of degree.” (Cammack, 1999: 94-95)
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that was in use by various mujahedin groups including those of the Northern
Alliance, but which has been much more systematically applied by the Taliban
regime. Applying this penal code is in itself a violation of all international
codes, and the fact that the judicial system has few or no safeguards makes the
situation even more critical.
Support to international terrorism: From the early 1980s, Peshawar was
developed into a centre for the training international fighters to join the
Afghan mujahedin. The recruits were mainly from Islamic countries, but
Western countries also supported their training. Around 1990, the number of
international volunteers was at its peak, with several thousands joining in the
fight over cities as Jalalabad and Khost. Whereas many returned after the fall
of the communist government in 1992, a large number remained, and the
contacts between a variety of radical Islamic organisations and mujahedin
groups were maintained. Kashmiri, Pakistani and Chinese militants trained in
Afghanistan, the mujahedin parties recruited Afghans to fight in Chechnya
and Azadbajan, and hosted training camps for the Islamic opposition from
Tajikistan during its civil war. In May 1996, the Rabbani government airlifted
Usama bin Laden and his associates from Sudan. Later, Bin Laden has become
a highly contentious issue between Taliban and the United States, the latter
claiming he is responsible for several terrorists attacks on US citizens. The
Taliban claims that the evidence presented by the US is not satisfactory, and
refuses to hand him over with further reference to the services he had rendered
to the Afghan people during jihad.
This discussion establishes unfortunate similarities between the practices of the
Taliban and their foes, the Northern Alliance, and fundamentally questions
the assumption that a government based on the latter would satisfy the
requirements of the international community. Hence, one could argue that
solutions to the current stalemate are not to be found in escalating support to
any present party but, rather, to adapt a wider time horizon allowing for
either a gradual negotiated change of the current actors or for a civilian
alternative to build up to gradually replace military rulers. As to the usefulness
and impact of sanctions, we will return to that below.
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5 Present humanitarian situation
Both humanitarian actors and the Afghan population agree that the situation
in Afghanistan has deteriorated further over the last couple of years, not least
due to drought that has hit large parts of the country. The drought has set in
at a time when large number of refugees have returned, some by force, to
areas where agricultural production has been the only income. In many areas,
the drought comes on top of the obstacles caused by the war, and this year a
combination of military activities and drought are forcing a large number of
Afghans to leave their homes. For many this is the second or third time they
become displaced. Both Tajikistan and Pakistan have been reluctant to allow
refugees enter, and the latter has argued that UNCHR should care for the
refugees on Afghan territory. Figures from the United Nations indicate that
120 000 are internally displaced in Afghanistan in 2000, adding to the 60 000
registered in 1999, and that a further 30 000 have entered into Pakistan. 6
When it comes to the capacity to implement aid, there has been a clear
improvement both when it comes to coordination and management of the
assistance process.  Agencies are increasingly supporting the Principled
Common Programming (PCP), and Regional Coordinators are now in place
inside Afghanistan. NGOs have become more actively involved in the Afghan
Programming Board and the Consolidated Appeal process.7
However, neither improvements in implementation mechanisms, nor the
general worsening of the humanitarian situation, have been reflected in levels
of funding. In 1999, only 44 % of the requirements listed in the appeal were
met, in 2000 there was a slight increase to 46 %, on top of which comes
responses to the drought appeal. The funding shortfall probably stems from
several issues, most prominent being the general dissatisfaction with Taliban`s
neglect of international sanctions, the ongoing war and the fact that there are
few short-term prospects for improvement.
The drought has initiated a discussion within the aid community about the
appropriateness of the assistance provided in Afghanistan. It has been
questioned why humanitarian agencies have been unable to prevent or
mitigate the effects at an earlier stage. It has been argued that the existing
mode of assistance can undermine rather than strengthens existing coping
mechanisms, and hence the effects of the drought have become much more
serious than it would otherwise have been. One example is that substantial
parts of international assistance come in the form of wheat, the distribution of
which could serve as a disincentive to domestic production if done in
widespread manner in the countryside.
                                           
6 UNOCHA (2000), Afghanistan 2001 Appeal. Islamabad, UNOCHA.
7 The number of humanitarian agencies has been relatively stable over the last few years. The
Ministry of Planning in Kabul has registered 70 International NGOs and 270 National, in
addition comes the ICRC, the IFRC, IOM and the various UN agencies.
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Most of the assistance is still short-term and emergency-oriented, although
some programmes, as UNDP`s PEACE programme, and some larger NGOs,
including the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan and DACAAR have secured
longer term funding. As serious is the fact that there is still minimal investment
is developing Afghan capacities within aid organisations. In the words of one
director of a large international NGO “ …we have underestimated the
capacity and professionality of Afghan NGOs”. Investing in national
capacities is directly linked to the funding arrangements - without long term
funding, capacity building is difficult.
A related question concerns the knowledge basis possessed by humanitarian
agencies. One problem is that of the international organisations have staff on
short-term contracts, or have expatriates only in decision making positions. At
a presentation in for expatriate staff in Herat last year we focused on the
maharram institution, which regulates the accompaniment of women by
closely related men in travel and work, and which is the key reference for the
Taliban in their approach to female staff in aid organisations. In spite of the
fact that most of those present were dealing with gender issues in assistance,
and several had frequent negotiations with the Taliban over such issues, there
was nobody who were aware that an institution like maharram existed.
During the last months there have been a wider debate over directions and
policies within the assistance community, with several important studies being
prepared in front of the forthcoming ASG meeting. Most attention has been
given to the study on the impact of UN Security Council Sanctions in
Afghanistan, prepared by the UN Humanitarian Co-ordinator, which has also
provoked a debate at the Security Council about the relationship between
humanitarian and political efforts in relation to Afghanistan. A second study is
named  “The UN and Capacity-building in Afghanistan”, and correctly points
out that despite the restrictions imposed in the PCP, 8 most UN agencies have
entered into a very close cooperation with the IAE in the field, some even
implementing projects through ministries or IEA established organisations. 9  A
third study, by a UN inter-agency task force, is a review of the impact of
Decree # 8, concerning the employment of women in assistance organisations.
The two latter studies are both taking a more critical view on the role and
practice of UN agencies and NGOs in dealing with what many like to call
“presumptive authorities”. This is certainly in line with what we earlier
described as the Afghanistan “aid practice”, but as the author of the capacity
study observes: “a more systematic approach to government structures, which
arguably can moderate Taliban excesses, is not acceptable as it is seen to
‘legitimise’ their rule.”  Furthermore, the report opposes the notion that there
is no interest within the ranks of the Taliban for welfare and development:
                                           
8 Which through para. 4 and 5 restricts institution and capacity- building activity building
activities and programmes that might be seen to give direct political or military advantage to
the parties of the conflict
9 Leader, N. (2000), Negotiating the "governance gap": The UN and Capacity-building in
Afghanistan. Islamabad, UNCHS Habitat, UN Capacity-building Task Force
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more pragmatic elements within the Taliban are now beginning to take such
matters more seriously. Consequently the report argues that time is due for
increasing contact and cooperation: “scaling-up” and “principled
negotiations” are suggested as guiding principles for the UN in bridging the
“policy gap”. His recommendation is “that it is recognised, by staff and
donors, that it is legitimate for the UN to work with or through the
authorities, as long as certain criteria are met and that all payment and
protocols are consistent between agencies.” The report further emphasises the
need to develop a longer-term human resource strategy, aided by a process of
discussion and research to inform the actors involved in the process.
The introduction of Principled Common Programming (PCP) means that one
has established an appropriate institutional frame for the planning and
implementation of assistance. The challenge now is to improve the content of
that frame. Firstly, there is a need to strengthen both the development and
dissemination of knowledge for providers of aid. Secondly, there is a need to
move from short-term to long-term commitments, project-wise as well as
funding-wise, and to shift more of processes and management inside
Afghanistan. Thirdly, one has to develop constructive and more unified modes
of engagement with the Taliban administration and then review if the current
Principles for Assistance Provision need to be altered.
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6 Four thematic issues
Here we will provide a more in-depth review of four issues that influences the
provision of humanitarian assistance, and that provides further arguments for
our observation on the major changes that have taken place over the last year.
These are firstly, the governance structure of the Taliban; secondly, drug
eradication; thirdly, the drought and relevant responses; fourthly, the UN
sanctions.
6.1 Taliban governance structure
Since their inception in 1994 there have been very few empirical studies aimed
at understanding the structure and governance capacity of, firstly, the Taliban
movement, and later on, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA). Many
reports from both the UN and NGOs question their governance capacity, with
the exception of enforcement of Sharia law and tax collection. When it comes
to administrative capacities beyond Kabul, the documentation is minimal.10
However, what one find in the field is a system being built up by the Taliban,
modelled on the governance structure that was in place in Afghanistan before
the coup d'état in 1978, including many of the former bureaucrats having
maintained their positions during successive regimes. Two distinct religious
features are added to the old set-up, an old “middleman” function is re-
established and a new community body has emerged at the district level (see
Annex II for sketch of the system):
a. The introduction of a Ministry for Vice and Virtue, which is also
represented at district and village levels. The Ministry is independent from
other Ministries, with direct links to the Emir Mullah Omar, and is set to
ensure that both people and the administration are following the Islamic
law and regulations of the Emirate.  The Ministry has been in place since
the establishment of the Taliban government.
b. A permanent ulema shura at district and provincial levels, where mullahs
from the district settle cases referred to them from the administration, as
well as cases presented to them from citizens. Furthermore, these shuras
are set to control the performance of the district and province
administration and there are reports from Wardak of a Taliban offical
being replaced following complaints from the local population to the
ulema shura.
c. At the local level, there was traditionally an arbar, malik or mir11 (for rural
villages) or a wakil e gozar (for municipality in urban areas). The arbab is
a middleman between authorities and locals, a local resident who has basic
                                           
10 This paper does not aim to give a comprehensive review of the present structure, but we
would like to present a sketch of a system. This has been developed following field-research in
Herat in 1999, interviews with a number of NGO employees both in 1999 and this year and a
recent visit to Kabul and Wardak.
11 This person/function has different titles in different parts of Afghanistan.
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local support, but who is formally appointed by the government. On
behalf of the government, the arbab collects taxes, selects recruits for the
military etc. The arbab is also the people’s contact in relation to
authorities, and may forward complaints to the administration, or assist
his people in court cases.
d. In addition comes a system of a ‘peoples shura’ where selected
representatives from the villages meet at the district level and handles
issues of importance for that district in consultation with the District
Administrator. This system has reportedly come in place over the six last
months, and can for example be found in several districts of Hazarajat. It
must be regarded as a significant development, since it implies that there is
now representative systems at the village level that is empowered to make
decisions about that particular area and possibly influence the
administrative structure of the IEA.
This is an administrative structure with certain checks and balances where the
new ulema shuras introduces a degree of accountability over local
administrations. Although the system as a whole suffers dramatically from the
lack of skilled personnel, it appears that administrative routines have
gradually improved, and consequently the Taliban perception of itself as the
legitimate rulers of Afghanistan is strengthened.
For humanitarian agencies the IEA governance structure might be particularly
important at the village and district level, and this seems to be where it is
functioning best and where it is most flexible. Much of the motivation is that
the Taliban should not become engaged in the numerous conflicts and disputes
at the village level, thus one need to create a local system to cope with such
events. One leading Taliban official argued that this system is developed on
the basis of a careful analysis if Afghanistan’s history and culture, rather than
being a copy of an administrative system that may function in a different
context. While there are variations from area to area the below-described
structure seems to gradually be introduced in many parts of the country.
This opens up possibilities for a more direct relationship between village
representatives and humanitarian agencies. Interestingly, this is a system that
resembles the district shura that have been promoted by several humanitarian
organisations, including UNDPs PEACE programme. The main risk now is
that humanitarian agencies may bypass this institution and rather favour their
own particular shura or community representatives, as many of them have
done in the past.
6.2 Drugs
Over the last months the United Nations Drug Control Program (UNDCP) has
indicated significant reductions in the opium production in Afghanistan,
reports that have been challenged by the US officials. However, NGOs
working in South Eastern Afghanistan confirm the UNDCP findings, but
remain uncertain as to whether this is a consequence of the drought, or the
result of systematic reductions in cultivation.
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Observers are also divided over the August edict from Mullah Omar, which is
banning all production of narcotic substance in Afghanistan. Some see it only
as another superficial attempt of meeting international demands, whereas
others argue that the Taliban has proven their will to enforce the edict in
many of the major poppy-growing areas. Reports from people who have
travelled in poppy growing areas show that there have been a number of
actions from the Taliban side, and that they have proven willing to use
substantial force to implement the edict.
Meetings and informal discussions with IEA officials in Kabul gave reasons to
believe that there is will within the Taliban ranks to stop production of drugs.
Implementing the ban involves significant risk to the Taliban. It can lead to
protest and even armed uprisings from affected populations, the Shinwari tribe
of Nangarhar has been seen as especially prone to revolt. The argument used
at the Foreign Ministry was that the IEA now had the control necessary to
enforce the rule, as it had clear justification in the Sharia law. With the
planting season coming up, one will soon have much stronger indications as to
the effectiveness of the edict.
Given both the current situation regarding funding for Afghanistan, and the
sanctions that aims at further isolation of the Taliban leadership, there is a
risk that a unique opportunity to curb one of the largest drug production
operations in the world is being missed. It is difficult to find arguments against
supporting the IEA in its efforts, although one would be advised to keep a
critical eye on how effective their operation is, given the knowledge that they
have benefited from tax imposed on the farmers.
The aid community and donors are presented to a dilemma, given that both
UNDCP and general rehabilitation programmes have announced that funding
for alternative agricultural production would be forthcoming if drug
production was reduced. If the ban on production is effective and this pledge
is not fully honoured, the international community will be loosing credibility,
and future efforts at dealing with the drug problem may have been
undermined.
6.3 The drought
A United Nations preliminary estimate suggests that at least half of the
population of Afghanistan may be affected by the drought, three to four
million severely and another eight to twelve million moderately, in the period
up to June 2001.12
                                           
12 UNOCHA (2000), Strategy of the Assistance Community in Response to the Drought in
Afghanistan. 1 June 2000 - 31 May 2001. Islamabad, UNOCHA: 15.
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Figure 1: Draught Map, August 2000
Source: ProMis, UNDP/FAO
It is further noted that the “latest drought comes when much of the Afghan
population is highly vulnerable and ill placed to cope with the additional
hardship.” Drought is not a new phenomenon in Afghanistan. The last major
drought occurred 30 years ago, but it affected far less areas than what is the
case this year. Given that 80% of the population live from farming, a drought
will have enormous consequences. For the two last years there have not been
any rain or snowfall, thus the rivers have dried up and the groundwater level
has gone down. This has sharply reduced the flow of water in the traditional
underground irrigation channels, the kareez, and dried out wells for both
drinking and irrigation purposes. Even if not all areas are equally hit, there are
a number of indicators in the data collected by the UN and by NGOs which
suggest that the situation may become worse and have longer term
implications than most people expect.13 FAO has recently issued a special alert
on the crisis, and presented figures on the production and import of cereals
that illustrates how this years drought comes on top of a consistent reduction
in production after 1998. See  FAO figure below.14
The gravity of the drought relates to how many Afghans over the past few
years have gradually used all reserves, and stand with very little capacity to
cope with the problem.
                                           
13 The UN draught officer in Kabul gave us access to surveys conducted in May and June this
year, and we visited drought affected villages in Wardak province.
14 FAO (2000). Special Alert no. 313: A Grave Food Situation in Afghanistan, FAO Global
Information and Early Warning System on Food and Agriculture: 3.
C M I
15
Figure 2: Afghanistan, Cereal Production and Imports
Source: FAO, 2000
We know that many people have already slaughtered or sold their household
animals, forced by the scarcity of water and fodder. In an overflowed market,
prices have been correspondingly low but is expected to be increased tenfold
when people gets in a position to purchase animals again. Similarly, there have
been reports about consumption of wheat seed set aside for planting. If this is
widespread, then people will not be in a position to restart their agricultural
production at full force even if the winter should bring both rain and snow.
This is an area where a systematic survey is needed, in order to establish the
necessary preparedness for the coming season.
The drought leads not only to the depletion of household resources, but also
natural resources more generally. In Wardak, we witnessed how people had
been cutting all trees and vegetation in a wide area surrounding their villages.
The wood was used for cooking and heating in the household, but also made
available for sale. Another example of how natural resources are affected is
the drilling of deep wells and the use of water pumps for irrigation purposes,
which easily leads to the further lowering of the groundwater table in many
areas. The results may be a permanent drying up of karezes and other
traditional water sources. Reports from many areas indicate that the water-
table has been dramatically lowered, so that at best it will take several seasons
with normal rain and snowfall to restore.
The gravity of the drought is also evident from the sharp increase in
migration, especially among able-bodied men, from villages to the cities, as
well as to Pakistan, Iran and the Gulf. The movement to far away job markets
is often a costly and risky investment for the family, and may mean the
establishment of debt. It also contributes to a negative spiral: with little
manpower left in the village there is no capacity to engage in activities that are
necessary for a longer-term improvement of the situation. An alternative to
labour migration is to join one of the fighting fractions, which given both
salary and coverage of basic necessities. In one valley with 42 villages in
Wardak province more than 100 men had reportedly joined the Taliban to
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secure income. In this way, drought is potentially contributing to prolong the
conflict.
As a consequence, the drought issue can not be constructively addressed
within an emergency framework. In fact many emergency-oriented responses,
such as drilling of waterholes or the free distribution of wheat may further
aggravate the situation. Given the complexity of the situation one need rather
to compose a “toolbox”, containing a range of different activities adjusted to
the severity of drought and the specific context in a given area. The ultimate
aim should be to restore adequate water-supplies, to train people in water-
management, and to prevent further soil erosion. Based on the understanding
that the present crisis could have been considerably less if it had been
addressed at an earlier stage, one should now attempt design a more
comprehensive response with a longer-term horizon.
The alternative, at least as it looks in Kabul and Wardak, may be massive
migration, of a scale not seen since the war-driven exodus of the mid-1980s.
We know from other situations that a population which has a broad
migration experience is much more likely to again resort to migration as a
coping mechanism.
6.4 Sanctions
The UN Security Council imposed sanctions on the Taliban in November
1999, as they did not honour a resolution to hand over terrorist accused
Osama bin Laden to the United States or a third country. The UN sanctions
are related to finance and aviation matters. Presently there is an ongoing
debate on imposing new and more far reaching sanctions as the Taliban has
rejected to comply with the UN demands. The Taliban have, in what may be
interpreted as opening up for a sensitive resolution of the dispute, suggested
three alternative solutions, none of which have been welcomed by the US.
Meanwhile there have been a number of general studies on the effects of
sanctions, and two looking particularly at the use of sanctions in Afghanistan.
A key question in the wider sanctions literature is whether the formulation of
'smart sanctions' is viable. It is widely recognised that sanctions in many
instances fail to reach their intended goals, there are those who argue that
these have failed as the right measures have not been applied – the sanctions
have not been ‘smart’ enough. A recent review of experiences from applying
sanctions to promote human right, however, concludes that:
Ultimately, it may very well turn out that smart sanctions are
simply not smart enough to achieve the stated objectives, and
remain a blunt instrument which will continue to cause violation
of economic and social rights on a large scale. It is probably an
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inappropriate instrument for the purpose of bolstering human
rights.15
Another study that focused specifically on Afghanistan was conducted for the
OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in 1999, as part of a larger
assessment termed The limits and scope for the use of development assistance
incentives and disincentives for influencing conflict situations.16 The overall
conclusion of this study is that ”attempts to use aid incentives and
disencentives to influence policies in Afghanistan has not been effective”.17 The
authors recommend continued assistance to Afghanistan: ”Withholding aid
would only aggravate the violations by the 'presumptive authorities' of the
social and economic rights of ordinary people.” Further:  ”…a more active
pursuit of strategies of persuasion through pragmatic examples, to
complement the strategies of denunciation and substitution actions that
bypasses the Taliban authorities that have dominated so far.” 18
In a synthesis report for the OECD - DAC study, Uvin questions the
politicisation of humanitarian assistance, with reference to practice in
Afghanistan and Rwanda:
This is clearly dangerous: a continued political use of this
decision may impede humanitarian access in the future. The
decision to use humanitarian assistance should be made in
function of people’s needs, and not of political messages to be
sent to governments - there are other ways to do the latter. 19
These above arguments gain importance in light of a recent study prepared for
the Office of the UN Humanitarian Co-ordinator for Afghanistan.20 This study
concludes ”The current U.N. measures have had a tangible negative effect on
the Afghan economy and on the ability of the aid agencies to render effective
assistance.” The study admits that these effects may be less significant than
other factors in the current context. However, it argues that ”Afghans have
little capacity to cope with further economic shocks.”21 (p. 45). The
assumption that sanctions may have an effect in terms of altering Taliban
policy is fundamentally put in doubt. Furthermore there is ”almost no support
                                           
15 Bull, B. & Tostensen, A. (2001), Bolstering Human Rights by Means of ’Smart’ Sanctions?,
in Human rights in development. Yearbook 1999/2000. The millennium edition, Kluwer Law
International/Nordic Human Rights Publications
16 K. Van Brabant and T. Killick. (1999), Case Study: Afghanistan, Paris, OECD, DAC,
Informal Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation
17 ibid., p. 6
18 ibid., p. 8
19 Uvin, P. (1999). The Influence of Aid in Situations in Violent Conflict. A Synthesis and
Commentary on the Lessons Learned form Case Studies on the Limit and Scope of the use of
Development Assistance Incentives and Disincetives for Influencing Conflict Situations. Paris,
OECD, DAC, Informal Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-Operation.
20 UNOCHA (2000). Vulnerability and Humanitarian Impact of UN Security Council
Sanctions in Afghanistan. Islamabad, Prepared by the UN Humanitarian Co-ordinator for
Afghanistan: 50.
21 ibid., p. 45
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within Afghanistan for further economic sanctions.”22 On a more positive
note, the study argues that there is a very strong consensus ”that the United
Nations political engagement on Afghanistan should be intensified”, and that
there is widespread support for an arms blockade.
Our own interviews with Afghans both in Afghanistan and Pakistan are in
accordance with the conclusions in the UNOCHA report. The issue has been
particularly relevant during our visit, in the build-up to a Security Council
discussion on further sanctions. It is clear from interviews with Taliban
officials that they see themselves as open for a settlement with the US on the
Bin Laden extradition issue, having presented what they regard as concrete
and viable alternative solutions. Most NGO employees did not believe that
further sanctions would lead to positive change within the Taliban, but rather
allow for more radical elements to increase their influence. Villagers
interviewed claimed that sanctions had negatively influenced their life
situation, referring to higher food prices and devaluation of the Afghani as
two examples. The blame for this was put squarely on the international
community, and specifically the US, for punishing them as Muslims and for
forgetting their sacrifices during the war against the Soviet Union.
Other concerns raised in the interviews and in media were:
· Missing opportunities through termination of the UN peace process
following increase in sanctions, at a time when the parties have showed
will to enter into negotiation for a peaceful settlement
· New sanctions could be seen to have grave humanitarian effects at a time
when the population of Afghanistan faces massive problems, such as the
drought
· Isolation of the Taliban implies that their external contact is with Pakistan
only, closing of any opportunities for a dialog with the wider international
community
· On what the Taliban see as their core Islamic values, the Taliban is
unlikely to be receptive to international pressure. New modes of dialogue
is necessary.
The only sanction that has widespread domestic legitimacy is an arms
embargo. Unfortunately, its effectiveness, however, can be questioned when it
comes to the aims of negotiating peace in Afghanistan. Firstly, it can be
perceived as if the whole blame is placed on the Taliban for the continuation
of the war. An arms embargo should rather be imposed on arms supplies to all
parties to the war in Afghanistan if the aim is to promote a peaceful
settlement. Secondly, it is virtually impossible to control an embargo. Not only
will it be almost impossible to seal off the boundary with Pakistan, but the
Taliban has also proven capable of purchasing arms in the larger international
market.
With the exception of a full arms embargo, there is every reason to question
the feasibility of sanctions in the context of Afghanistan. It is also worth
taking note of the fact that Afghan civilians are already exposed to multiple
                                           
22 Ibid., p. 46
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vulnerabilities including this years serious drought: the effect of sanctions
comes on top of this, and is seen as a clear indication that the international
community has no sensitivity to their needs.
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7 Conclusion
We argue that there is a severe humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan, that
continued dialogue seems more feasible than sanctions when it comes to
altering of negative aspects of the political/military groups and that the
humanitarian agencies have initiated an important review process that needs
to be taken further. In concluding this report we would like to highlight three
issues we feel are particularly important for the provision of humanitarian
assistance in Afghanistan in the present situation.
7.1 Distinguish humanitarian and political efforts
The sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council, but also limitations
implicit in the Principles for Assistance Provision,23 have had negative effects
on the provision of humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan. However, a part
of the problem is that, in line with traditional 'aid practice' in Afghanistan, the
dilemmas that humanitarian actors face have not been openly discussed.
Hence, there has been no concerted attempt to develop policies that do not
violate basic humanitarian principles. Agencies have, by necessity, entered into
various arrangements and engagements with the Taliban, while attempting to
downplay their importance. The result is that relations between humanitarian
actors and the de facto state function in Afghanistan has become extremely
unclear. This is also confusing to the Taliban, who relate to a UN that is
simultaneously a provider of humanitarian assistance, a peace negotiator, and
a sanctions enforcement body.
Credit should be given to the Humanitarian Coordinator for lifting the
humanitarian values up above the political discourse, and pointing out where
the two processes are incompatible. The logical next step is to accept the
realities on the ground, and transparently establish relations with the Taliban
authorities, rather than undermining any future opportunities to do so
through so-called flexible arrangements. The need for a transparent approach
is further underlined by issues discussed above, including the pressing
humanitarian needs, as well as the potential ability of the Taliban to seriously
address drug production.
Such an approach stand in opposition to those who would argue that one
should not by any means contribute to the legitimisation of the Taliban, unless
it complies with existing international demands concerning terrorism and the
extradition of Bin Laden, and on human rights. Whereas these are important
concerns, their resolution through increased international sanctions does not
seem likely although international pressure on the Taliban is a necessity. It
may be an alternative to let the sanction issue rest, while concentrating on
developing constructive dialogue and responses to the pressing humanitarian
                                           
23 For details refer to chapter 3.5 in UNOCHA (2000), Afghanistan 2001 Appeal. Islamabad,
UNOCHA.
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needs. If further Security Council sanctions are imposed, one should clearly
distinguish between the political and humanitarian roles of the UN.
Following the arguments above we would recommend that the humanitarian
agencies accept that the Taliban is a “fact of life” in Afghanistan, rooted in a
traditional village based  “outlook on life”. The challenge, whatever authority
structure exists, is to find ways to ensure that administrative and governance
structures are transparent and receptive to needs of the citizens, and to
encourage a shift in focus from a military and war-focused mentality to taking
on responsibility for the country's citizens. At the district and province levels
there appears to be ample opportunities for engaging with and further
encourage the establishment of village-based bodies, which could be ideal for
both grassroots oriented rehabilitation, development and peace-building work.
This again rests on the willingness of aid agencies to give up sovereignty, and
to respect the influence that such bodies may wish to have on priority settings.
Coordination at this level might prove more helpful than numerous meetings
and arrangements at the national level.
7.2 Long-term assistance
The lessons learned from the drought point in two directions. Firstly, it
appears that the effects of the drought could have been mitigated if the
assistance community had applied a less emergency relief oriented approach
over the last years. Secondly, the problem is potentially of such a magnitude
that it will shape survival strategies, migration patterns and agricultural
production in Afghanistan for years to come. The implication is that there is a
need both for short-term measures to meet the present demand, as well as long
term strategic planning. As things stand, access to long-term funding is a
serious obstacle, but the current situation carries strong arguments as to why
funding and implementation arrangements needs to be changed.
A reorientation to work with a longer time horizon has many implications.
Existing projects are often “hardware” oriented, expensive, and expatriate-
intensive. More adequate responses would be “software” oriented, and build
on Afghan national capacities. What we have called the Afghan “aid practice”
carries with it a number of dysfunctional intertias.  One of them being that
most aid agencies have the headquarters in Pakistan. While implementation
and day to day management is done in Afghanistan, decision-making is based
in Pakistan. Although security remains a concern, it is clear that operations
will be both more cost/effective and more responsive to people's needs if
headquarters were shifted to Afghanistan.
7.3 Knowledge-building and operationalisation
The United Nations humanitarian agencies deserve credit for recently having
initialised several critical studies of aspects of the humanitarian aid system.
This has stimulated necessary debate over key issues, such as the impact of
sanctions, and how to relate to the Taliban administration. The challenge is to
maintain the drive created by these studies, and particularly to address much
C M I
22
more systematically the changes to Afghan society that has been caused by the
war.
It is critical that the competence to conduct such studies is also built up within
Afghanistan. Future studies and assessments should institutionalise a
counterpart system, in which the Afghan researchers are working in tandem
with experienced international analysts. To reach a critical mass in terms of
required research competence is only going to be possible if developing
indigenous capacities.
A key to the United Nations, and to the national and international NGOs, will
be to develop means of disseminating and operationalising study findings.
That test is here and now, as some of the studies that are brought into the
public at the moment present very concrete suggestions as to how to modify
aid practice in Afghanistan.
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ANNEX I
List of people interviewed and met with
ISLAMABAD
Embassy of Islamic Emirate
of Afghanistan H. Fouzi, First Secretary
Embassy of Norway,
Islamabad T. Toreng, Ambassador
B. Johannessen, Dep. Head of Mission
S. Bleken, First Secretary
UNDP, Islamabad Knut Østby, Acting Res. Rep.
PESHAWAR
ANCB Eng. H. Gul
Eng. M. Shah Barez
ARIC N. H. Dupree
CARE, International Eng. Rahimi
CCA Eng. Hussini
CoAR Eng. Naeem
CPAU Eng. Fahim
M. Suleman
M. Ehsan
DACAAR T. Thomsen
HAFO Eng. Jawed
PRB Eng. Kabir
SCA A. Fange
UN CDAP Dr. F. Wardak
KABUL
CoAR National staff
IAM Information Officer
Ministry of Planning Eng. Zalmy
Ministry of Planning Mullah Izatullah, Deputy Minister
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Mr. Afghani, Protocol Department
NCA National staff
UNDP, Drought department Eng. Salimi
SAIDABAD – WARDAK
CoAR Staff at Regional Office
Village Nazeer Khel Villagers
Village Nazeer Khel Shura representative
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Amirul
Mu’mineen
(Leader of the
Faithful)
Leadership
council
MINISTRIES
PROVINCE ADMINISTRAT-
ION & MINISTRIES
 –(in some provinces)
Province
Governor
District /municipality
Administrator &
Administration
                         VILLAGE/
                  MUNICIPALITY
MALIK/
WAKIL
Peoples
Shura*
Village
/municipality
representative
PROVINCIAL
ULEMA
SHURA
DISTRICT
ULEMA
SHURA
Mullah
ULEMA NETWORK
KANDAHAR BASED
MINISTERIAL
NETWORK
KABUL BASED
*Note: These Peoples Shuras are not operational in all districts, but have been established over the last 6
month where the Taliban might not be in full command (as in Hazarajat) or where an aid agency (as
CDAP) have established a shura structure. In both cases they relate to the District Administrator, and the
villagers select their representatives for the District Shura. Neither is the malik title used on this function
in all parts of Afghanistan, nor is this function present in all villages and areas.
Case referral
Case refrerral
Control
Control
Min.
of
Vice &
Virtue
V
&
V
V
&
V
ANNEX  II
TALIBAN/ IEA GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE
Summary
ISSN 0805-505X
ISBN 82-8062-003-6
More than twenty years of war and civil war and a severe drought
has increased the vulnerability of the Afghan population. The
warring fractions, the Taliban and the Northern Alliance, show
low concern for the population and unfortunate similarities in
their practise of relating to drug production and trafficking,
violation of human rights and support to international terrorism.
Hence, a solution to the current political stalemate and
humanitarian challenges is not likely to be found in escalating
support to or sanction of one of these parties. Though rather in
increased contact and dialogue with the parties to the conflict and
civil society groups, establishing a longer-term strategy to build
civilian structures.
The report provides a review of the Taliban governance
structure, discusses the possible impacts of a Taliban ban on drug
production and how the drought influences migration. It is
pointed out that the present UN sanctions does not seem to have
any significant impact on the Taliban, but are perceived as unjust
by a majority of the population.
United Nations, donors and humanitarian agencies are
recommended to make a clear distinction between their
humanitarian and political efforts. The humanitarian intervention
requires a longer time horizon and more emphasis on “software”
and strengthening of national capacities.
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